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WHY IS THERE PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA?* 
(Sixth Gonda lecture, held on 13 November 1998 on the premises of the Royal Netherlands Academy of 
Arts and Sciences. Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. 1999.) 
 
[5] 
Many Indologists are deeply concerned to show that there is such a thing as Indian 
rational philosophy. They are upset by the fact that most people in the modern Western 
world, including philosophers, do not expect to find such a thing in ancient India. India, 
common knowledge teaches, is a land of spirituality and wisdom, but not of hard-
headed analysis and serious debate. This common knowledge dates to before the 
beginning of our era, and it is unlikely that it will disappear any time soon. 
 This common knowledge is wrong, as Indologists know. India has had a long 
tradition of rational debate, linked to systematic attempts to make sense of the world 
and our place in it. For a long time different systems of philosophy existed side by side, 
and during much of this time their adherents made major efforts to show that only their 
own system was right, and that the others were wrong or incoherent. The result of this 
ongoing debate was that many thinkers tried to improve their own systems, and in the 
process refined and developed them. At the same time the art of debate and of proof 
received ample attention, and logic underwent a long development which scholars are 
still engaged in unraveling.1 
                                                
* This is an improved version of the lecture that was presented before the Royal Netherlands Academy of 
Arts and Sciences in Amsterdam in November 1998, and has been published in 1999. In writing and 
improving this lecture I have profited from discussions with various scholars; I would like to mention in 
particular Richard Gombrich, Geoffrey Lloyd, Sara McClintock, Ada Neschke, Frits Staal. Others — 
among them Tilmann Vetter and Hans Bakker — have given useful feedback after the lecture was 
presented before the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. A second presentation at 
Stanford University in March 1999 gave rise to a spirited debate, in which especially Bernard Faure, 
Allan Grapard and Carl Bielefeldt made interesting observations. Discussions during the workshop 
"Rationality in Asia" (Leiden, June 4-5 1999) allowed me to make further improvements. No need to 
specify that I alone bear responsability for the opinions here expressed.  
1 Discussions during the workshop "Rationality in Asia" have convinced me of the importance of one of 
these features, viz., that thinkers feel obliged to improve their own systems under the influence of the 
criticism aimed at them. Examples of criticism and disagreement may be found in a variety of human 
cultures, but instances of resulting changes in the systems that are subjected to criticism may be much 
less common. Such changes constitute however the dynamic of the history of classical Indian philosophy, 
as will be argued below. See also the article "Understanding Indian philosophy", elsewhere in this 
volume. Randall Collins (1998: 163 f.) deals with the same issue where he observes that there is abundant 
evidence that conflict is sometimes creative but that some kinds of structural rivalry drive innovation by 
opposition whereas others have the opposite effect on intellectual life, producing stagnation and 
particularism; the presence or absence of a tradition of rational inquiry (see below), not envisaged by him, 
may help to solve this problem. 
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 These features combined, along with a further condition which I will specify in a 
minute, I will call a tradition of rational inquiry.2 India has such a tradition of rational 
inquiry, but the same is, as I will argue, not true of all human cultures. The presence of 
a tradition of rational inquiry in India expresses itself, as I indicated already, in its 
tradition of rational debate and in the result thereof, the attempts [6] made by many 
thinkers to improve their own system, and the refinements and developments that this 
entailed.3 The further condition which I have not yet specified is that in a tradition of 
rational inquiry there are no areas of reality which are fundamentally beyond the realm 
of critical examination, no areas which should exclusively be left to tradition, 
revelation, or insight.4 This aspect seems to have to do with the belief that rational 
inquiry can be used even in realms which might encroach upon other sources of 
authority, such as tradition and religion, and even ordinary perception. It is perhaps no 
                                                
2 Some such use of the term ‘rational’ is not new, and is close to its use by William Warren Bartley III 
and Peter Munz; cp. Munz, 1985: 50: "We say, if we are Panrationalists, that it is rational to criticise 
everything and to hold on to only those statements which have so far withstood criticism. In this view, 
‘reason’ does not denote a substantive faculty or a correct method of arriving at statements which are 
true; but a negative quality. When one is rational, one is open to criticism and an absolutely limitless 
invitation to criticism is the essence of rationality." Cp. further the statement "there is no better synonym 
for ‘rational’ than ‘critical’" attributed to K. Popper by Piatek (1995: 171) (cp. Popper, 1998: 109; 
Artigas, 1999); also Miller, 1994; Munz, 1993: 177. — Note that already Plato described reasoning "as 
the silent debate of the soul with itself" (Sorabji, 1993: 10, with references to Theaetetus 189E-190A, 
Sophist 263E-264A, Philebus 38C-E; but see also Sorabji, 1993: 65-67), i.e. as what we might call an 
interiorized debate; cp. note 6, below. Sorabji further draws attention (1993: 36-37, further 67-71; with 
reference to De Anima 3.3) to Aristotle's claim "that belief involves being persuaded, which in turn 
implies possessing reason (logos)". This does not necessarily involve dialogue with others, and Sorabji 
assumes that "Aristotle would allow his persuasion to be self-persuasion". — The use of the term 
‘rational’ here advocated does away with the problem of having to distinguish between different forms of 
‘reason’ or ‘rationality’ as maintained, e.g., by Pierre Vidal-Naquet (Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1990: 
Présentation). 
3 It is interesting to recall here what Richard H. Popkin, the foremost expert of the sceptical tradition in 
the West, says about scepticism (1996: xviii): "For years I have been toying with the idea of writing an 
article describing scepticism as being like an anonymous letter. The question of who is the author may be 
of some interest, but it is not the main concern. The recipient has the letter. The letter raises a host of 
problems for the recipient in defending his or her dogmatic philosophical position. Whether the 
anonymous author can be found or identified, dead or alive, sane or insane, does not help in dealing with 
or dismissing the problems. So whether scepticism can be consistently stated is not the main point. The 
thrust of the sceptical attack is in the effect it has on the dogmatist, who cannot evade the thrust by 
denouncing the sceptical opponent whom he or she may not be able to find, identify or classify. It is the 
dogmatists who have to do the defending, if they can, regardless of whether the sceptic really exists as a 
flesh and blood member of the human race, or as a raving inmate of a mental institute, or a science fiction 
character. ... The sceptic, real or imaginary, has led the non-sceptics to struggle over and over again to 
find a coherent and consistent way of putting their intellectual house in acceptable order (acceptable to 
honest dogmatists), only to find that another sceptic, real or imaginary, is creating another mass of doubts 
that require further examination and rethinking. The sceptic, the anonymous letter writer, does not have to 
be part of that process, but only has to await the results, and be ready to prepare another anonymous 
letter." 
4 This last condition in particular distinguishes a ‘tradition of rational inquiry’ from ‘rationality’ as 
understood by various authors. See, e.g., Staal, 1989; Goody, 1996: ch. 1. 
 A contemporary debate where the parties involved do not seem willing to allow that there are no 
areas of reality which are fundamentally beyond the realm of critical examination is the religious 
dialogue between Moslems and Christians. Cp. Waardenburg, 1998: 48: "Le débat entre les deux 
religions tient ainsi d'une sorte de compétition pour la ‘possession’ de la Révélation", et p. 109: "Aussi 
triviale que la remarque puisse paraître, la différence essentielle entre un monologue et un dialogue réside 
tout de même dans le fait que dans le second cas on écoute et répond à ce qu'a dit l'autre. ... Dans ce sens, 
le dialogue interreligieux et notamment celui entre musulmans et chrétiens commence à peine." 




 January 5, 2009 
coincidence that both in ancient Greece and [7] in ancient India, soon after traditions of 
rational inquiry had established themselves, thinkers appeared who put unlimited 
confidence in the power of reasoning. Both the Eleatics in Greece and Någårjuna and 
his followers in India did not hesitate to reject perceived reality on the basis — not of 
tradition, revelation, or special insight — but of mere argument.5 Let me add that 
having a tradition of rational inquiry does not imply that every thinker is rational, i.e. 
critical and open, in all respects and in all the areas about which they express 
themselves. What is more, having a tradition of rational inquiry is not the same as being 
able to think intelligently. People may think intelligently about a variety of things, 
without tresspassing into areas that belong to tradition, revelation, insight or religion.6 
 The presence of a tradition of rational inquiry in India may not look very 
remarkable to the modern inheritors of Greek thought which we are, and yet I believe it 
is. It seems that apart from ancient Greece and India and their inheritors there are no 
other instances where an independent tradition of rational inquiry has come into being. I 
realize that this claim will particularly disturb those who maintain that there are three 
philosophical traditions in human history: those connected with Europe, India, and 
China respectively.7 It seems that China has never had a rational tradition in the sense 
proposed here. I'll argue this point, following the lead of the Sinologist A. C. Graham, 
who has given a great deal of thought to the question of rationality in China.8 
[8] 
 Interestingly, Graham does think that China has known rationality.9 He 
dedicates a chapter of his book Disputers of the Tao (1989) to it. Here we read: "In 
                                                
5 This is an enduring feature of the two traditions. For Greece, cp. Lloyd, 1991: 102: "The readiness of 
Greek philosophers early middle and late to countenance radical and radically counter-intuitive solutions 
— driven by arguments — is indeed a recurrent phenomenon distinctive of what the Greeks themselves 
understood by rationality." For India, see the example of Vasubandhu to be discussed below, and other 
examples in Bronkhorst, 1999a. 
6 Note that a tradition of rational inquiry, a social fact, is here taken to exert a decisive influence on 
individual thought, a psychological fact. Cp. Horton, 1993: 330: "[T]he Old Adam ... is anything but 
spontaneously self-critical. So far as possible, he hangs on to his established framework come what may. 
If he starts to criticize it himself, this is usually only by way of anticipating the critical assaults of other 
thinkers committed to rival frameworks. In [a] consensual setting, such others are by definition absent." 
7 See most recently Scharfstein, 1997; 1998: chapter 1. For references to earlier literature, see Halbfass, 
1997: 302. References to literature in which more than just three philosophical traditions are recognised 
in Halbfass, 1997: 301; Scharfstein, 1998: footnote on p. 4-5, with p. 532 note 6. 
8 Cp. further Jullien, 1995. For a recent discussion of the issue, see Goody, 1996: 26 f. Kohn's (1995) 
discussion of the debates between Buddhists and Taoists is interesting in this connection. 
9 Graham's reflections induce J.J. Clarke (1997: 200) to state that "it is plausible to argue that Eastern 
ways of thinking have a rationality that may differ in certain respects from those characteristic of the 
West, but which is not the less ‘rational’ for that". Personally I would be more inclined to agree with 
Chad Hansen who — in a chapter on "methodological reflections" which agrees in various ways with 
positions taken by me in connection with the interpretation of an Indian text (Bronkhorst, 1986: xiii f.) — 
observes (1983: 19): "... that Chinese philosophy is logical in something like a dispositional sense is not a 
discovery but [our] decision. It is a decision to propose, criticize, and defend interpretations in a 
particular way, using consistency and coherence as critical standards." This methodological position does 
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China rationality develops with the controversies of the schools, and dwindles as they 
fade after 200 B.C." (p. 75). He draws attention to the so-called ‘sophists’ in China, and 
compares them with the Greek Eleatics: "Nothing could be more disorientating, more 
disruptive, than reason first awakening to and revelling in its powers. One may well 
wonder how philosophy ever gets past this stage, with the most ancient paradoxes 
forever returning to plague it. The first discovery of uninhibited reason is that it leads 
inevitably to absurd conclusions. So why go farther? The Greeks did get past this initial 
disorientation, the Chinese never did." (p. 75-76). It is open to question whether the 
Eleatics' way of questioning should be described as "disorientation", even though the 
term may very well apply in the Chinese situation. The Eleatics used their reason not 
only to undermine the universally accepted conception of the real world, but 
furthermore to determine what reality is like: unborn, imperishable, whole, unique, 
immovable, etc.10 Note here that the Indian philosopher Någårjuna arrived at the 
equally concrete and daring conclusion that no thing exists, as Claus Oetke's recent 
analyses have shown.11 The Chinese thinkers mentioned by Graham, on the other hand, 
do not seem to have used their reasoning for much beyond "hair-splitting and 
paradoxical talk", as they were accused of doing. Indeed, one of their most famous 
paradoxes concerned the "white horse": the claim was made that a white horse is not a 
horse. It appears therefore that reason in India and Greece could be used to challenge 
tradition and other sources of authority, [9] whereas in China much less importance was 
attached to this new tool. Logically it may be possible to compare the situations in the 
three traditions. From the point of view of the importance given to rational argument, 
even in the hands of the so-called ‘sophists’, reasoning in China does not seem to have 
emancipated itself from the level of simple spielerei. 
 Graham sums up the situation in his article "Rationalism and anti-rationalism in 
pre-Buddhist China" (1989a). He observes there (p. 142/98-99): "About 300 B.C. the 
Later Mohists undertake the enterprise of grounding the whole Mohist ethic in the 
analysis of moral concepts. This surely is rationalism as we find it in Greece, the 
plainest example in the Chinese tradition. But the Sophists have already provoked the 
reaction of the Taoist Chuang-tzu (c. 320 B.C.), who will have a much more lasting 
influence in Chinese thought. ... Chuang-tzu's position is ‘anti-rationalism’ (denial that 
                                                                                                                                         
not, of course, tell us anything about the extent to which Chinese thinkers themselves were willing to 
apply such standards in areas belonging to tradition, revelation, insight or religion. 
10 Cp. Guthrie, 1965: 26 f., 87 f. 
11 E.g. Oetke, 1988. It is regrettable that Guthrie (1965: 53 n. 1), instead of comparing Parmenides with 
Någårjuna, compares him with "the cosmic illusion of Maya in Indian thought". No wonder that he 
arrives at the conclusion that "India and Parmenides are poles apart" and that "in truth the motives and 
methods of the Indian schools, and the theological and mystical background of their thought, are so 
utterly different from those of the Greeks that there is little profit in the comparison". Guthrie, and no 
doubt many others with him, had fallen prey to the tendency to see mysticism in everything Indian. 
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reason is the right means to see things as they are) rather than ‘irrationalism’ (which 
allows you to see things as you like). After 200 B.C. Chinese thinking channels in the 
orthodox Confucian direction (ethical, practical, conventional) and the unorthodox 
Taoist (spontaneous, mystical, disreputable). The former is often ‘rational’, in that it 
checks its synthesizing by analysis, but not ‘rationalistic’ in the sense of Later Mohist or 
Greek thought, which tries to detach rational demonstration wholly from common-sense 
synthesizing; the latter remains anti-rationalist as philosophical Taoism, and its 
continuation as Ch’an or Zen in Chinese Buddhism." It seems clear that a tradition of 
rational inquiry, in which the power of reasoning was considered, not just useful or 
amusing, but a vital instrument for establishing the truth at all levels, even those 
normally claimed by other sources of authority, has never seen the light of day in 
China.12 It is in this context interesting to observe that Indian Buddhist logic, when 
introduced into China in the seventh century of our era, did not survive for long. Its fate 
was to be mainly handed down as a secret science in Buddhist circles, and largely 
ignored by everyone else.13 And a [10] thousand years later, when Western 
mathematical astronomy was introduced to China and accepted by an imperial decision, 
its principal Chinese proponents argued that its archaic foundations had originated in 
                                                
12 The absence of systematic criticism had consequences which Landes describes in the following terms 
(1998: 344): "This want of exchange and challenge, this subjectivity, explains the uncertainty of gains 
and the easy loss of impetus. Chinese savants had no way of knowing when they were right. It is 
subsequent research, mostly Western, that has discovered and awarded palms of achievement to the more 
inspired." 
 Note that Graham was very much concerned with the query dealt with in this lecture, as is 
evident, for example, from the questions he formulated in the Preface to his Later Mohist Logic, Ethics 
and Science (1978: xi): "Is the Greek ideal of rationality a discovery made once only in history, or does it 
have parallels in India and China? Are there episodes in Oriental, as in Greek and Mediaeval science, 
which anticipate in part the Scientific Revolution in the 17th century?" Note further Harbsmeier’s (1998: 
268) observation to the extent that in ancient China "[r]easoning tended to consist in an appeal to 
historical example and traditional authority", the very opposite of what we mean by rational inquiry. 
13 See Frankenhauser, 1996, esp. pp. 19, 25. Harbsmeier (1998: 361) points out, no doubt correctly, "that 
Buddhist logic in India had its social roots in the wide-spread practice of public philosophical debate, 
whereas this social practice never quite took root in China". Harbsmeier further reports that he has carried 
out a comparative study of the Sanskrit and Chinese versions of the Nyåyapraveßa (with the help of 
several Sanskritists) which has led him to the following remarkable conclusion (p. 402): "Hsüan-Tsang's 
Chinese translation is not only often an improvement on the Sanskrit original, it has turned out — to my 
great surprise — to be generally easier to read as well." This suggests that there is no reason whatsoever 
to attribute the relatively minor role of logic in China to the Chinese language. 
 Towards the end of Harbsmeier's book we find the following reflections with regard to Chinese 
Buddhist logic (yin ming) (p. 414): "One may speculate why this remarkable logical flourish in China 
remained as marginal as it did to the Chinese intellectual tradition as a whole. Obvious perennial 
questions re-emerge from these summary considerations: Why did Buddhist logic not catch on even 
among Chinese Buddhists, not to speak of Chinese thinkers within other traditions? Why, for that matter, 
do we not find a sustained presence of a significant intellectual subculture cultivating the traditions of yin 
ming and of Mohist logic for that matter? Why did no one want to read the yin ming literature? Why did 
those who did read it in later times tend to misunderstand it? Why did the practice of yin ming decline 
whereas Aristotelian logic was revived and developed into a central discipline within the European 
educational curriculum? These are questions that belong properly to the anthropology of logic. They 
concern the societal and cultural conditions that may or may not favour the cultural and sociological 
success of the intellectual practice of the science of logic." Is it possible that a tradition of rational inquiry 
is to be counted among the societal and cultural conditions that may favour this cultural and sociological 
success of logic? 
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China and subsequently made their way westward, so that studying it could not be 
considered a rejection of tradition.14 
 The comparison with China is interesting and useful in many ways. It shows that 
the absence of a tradition of rational inquiry has nothing whatsoever to do with stupidity 
or backwardness. China, as we now know thanks to Joseph Needham's Science and 
Civilisation in China, has made a large number of important discoveries [11] in the field 
of technology in the course of its history, and was perhaps technologically the most 
advanced country on earth at the dawn of the scientific revolution in Europe.15 In other 
words: not having a tradition of rational inquiry is not the same as not being able to 
think intelligently. 
 It seems possible, then, that there are two, and only two, independent traditions 
of rational debate and inquiry (in the sense indicated above) in the history of mankind. 
These two are, in their oldest accessible forms, linked to Greece and India 
respectively.16 Such a tradition, once properly established, attains an impetus of its own, 
which may ensure its continuation, also in less than ideal circumstances. Greek thinking 
subsequently influenced the Hellenistic world and its inheritors, primarily Western 
Europe and the world of Islam, and its tradition of rational inquiry came along, usually 
in a watered down form.17 Indian thought, especially in its Buddhist forms, spread east-
                                                
14 Sivin, 1982: 546 ff.; Jami, 1993; Engelfriet, 1998: 428. It is doubtful whether Waley-Cohen is right 
when she states (1999: 110): "To encourage serious attention to the new knowledge, eminent scholars 
created a myth that Western mathematics had evolved out of ancient Chinese ideas. This device did not 
spring from cultural chauvinism but from a desire to assure the acceptance of the foreign methods in 
China, where innovation gained quicker acceptance with the sanction of antiquity. Declaring a Chinese 
origin for Western science both gave the foreign knowledge legitimacy and made the study of 
mathematics and astronomy part of the scholarly movement to return to original Confucianism." 
 There was also a revival of interest in Buddhist logic (yin ming) in early 20th century China; the 
probably most important reason was "the deep-seated desire for a distinctly Eastern logical and 
methodological identity. Yin ming provided a way of being scientific in method and deeply spiritual in 
purpose, while remaining Chinese — or in any case oriental — in basic outlook." (Harbsmeier, 1998: 
367). 
15 It is not without interest to recall in this connection the impressive maritime expeditions that took the 
Chinese to many Asian countries and even Africa eighty years before Vasco da Gama; see Levathes, 
1994; Landes, 1998: 93-98. 
 David S. Landes, in his book The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998: 45 ff.), draws attention 
to the fact that many Chinese inventions were confined to the imperial court and had little impact on 
society at large. He further speaks about the "mystery [of] China's failure to realize its potential" (p. 55 f., 
with some explanations that have been put forward) and wonders why there was "subsequent retreat and 
loss" after "exceptional creativity and precocity" (p. 339). 
 With regard to the natural sciences, Huff (1993: 48; cp. pp. 237 f.) notes "that from the eighth 
century to the end of the fourteenth, Arabic science was probably the most advanced science in the world, 
greatly surpassing the West and China". 
16 It is open to question whether the Indian sciences took part in and profited from this tradition of 
rational debate and inquiry. Cp. Randall Collins, 1998: 551: "Organizationally, the mathematicians, 
astronomers, and medical doctors were based in private familistic lineages and guilds, never part of the 
sustained argument provided by philosophical networks. Public networks of argument did exist in India; 
its philosophical lineages reached high levels of abstract development. Only mathematics and science 
were not carried along with it." See further Bronkhorst, 2001. 
17 On the passage of Greek thought into Arabic culture, see Gutas, 1998. The Arab conquests, as Gutas 
points out (p. 13), united areas and peoples that for a millennium had been subjects to Hellenization ever 
since Alexander the Great. 
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ward, and its tradition of rational inquiry, though not able to acquire a lasting foothold 
in China, left its traces in the Tibetan tradition of debate. The possibility that there are 
two and only two independent traditions of rational inquiry gives the question "why is 
there philosophy in India?" (granted that Indian philosophy, or part of it, is an 
expression of a tradition of rational inquiry) an interest that extends far beyond 
Indology. If this kind of philosophy is such an exceptional thing, something that does 
not automatically come about wherever human beings have enough leisure to think of 
more than their daily concerns, how and why did it arise in India, and not in any other 
civilizations except ancient Greece? The question becomes even more interesting if we 
consider the probable proposition that rational debate (including criticism), and the need 
to develop rational and coherent systems of thought that went hand in hand with it, was 
(and still is) a essential element (though only one out of several) in the development of 
modern science, and therefore a precondition for the immense and sudden 
developments that have changed life on earth virtually beyond recognition within a 
period of barely two centuries.18 By [12] raising these questions and considering these 
                                                
18 Several authors emphasize the central role of inter-theoretic competition in the growth of science; see, 
e.g., Horton, 1993: 301-346 ("Tradition and modernity revisited", originally published in 1982), esp. p. 
318 f.; Lloyd, 1990: 37. For its unwillingness to accept the dictates of authority, see Cohen, 1994: 157-
160 ("The vanishing role of authority in science"). Landes (1998: 203 with p. 542 n. 9), mentioning Noah 
Efron, refers to David Gans, an early seventeenth-century popularizer of natural science, according to 
whom one knows that magic and divining are not science because their practitioners do not argue with 
one another. It should here be emphasized that a tradition of rational inquiry, too, can loose a great deal of 
its critical spirit by elevating one or more of its critical thinkers, e.g. Aristotle, to the rank of an authority. 
(See Decorte, 1992, for a description of Medieval European philosophy as an attempt to subordinate 
rationality to a "higher" aim. For a comparative discussion of the medieval European universities as 
institutions in which "organized skepticism" was possible, on the other hand, see Huff, 1993.) 
 The question as to how and why Western Europe, unlike many other parts of the world, managed 
to largely get rid of its commentarial tradition cannot be dealt with here (on the notion of traditions of 
exegesis, see Henderson, 1991). Randall Collins (1998: 793) is less certain that modern Western Europe 
has really freed itself from this tradition: "A textual-scholastic mode becomes prominent again in the 
university scholarship of the 1800s and 1900s, within both philosophy and other disciplines. The study 
and commentary on classic texts of ‘dead Germans’ is a large part of contemporary sociological theory; 
and in the contemporary academic world more generally there is polemic over the attention paid to the 
canon of ‘white European males’ — a polemic whose principal results are to enlarge the canon, not to 
move away from the textual commentary mode." 
 For a description of modern science in progress, of its agonistic nature and of the major efforts 
made to construct positions that can resist the most insistent criticism from competing "colleagues", the 
observations by Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979), though made to support a relativistic view of 
science, are useful; see also Callon, 1989. Less relativistic, but as interesting, is Collins & Pinch, 1998. 
See also Hull, 1988. 
 With regard to the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment which emerged from it, Edward 
O. Wilson (1998: 22) makes the following apposite remarks: "It has become fashionable to speak of the 
Enlightenment as an idiosyncratic construction by European males in a bygone era, one way of thinking 
among many different constructions generated across time by a legion of other minds in other cultures, 
each of which deserves careful and respectful attention. To which the only decent response is yes, of 
course — to a point. Creative thought is forever precious, and all knowledge has value. But what counts 
most in the long haul of history is seminality, not sentiment. If we ask whose ideas were the seeds of the 
dominant ethic and shared hopes of contemporary humanity, whose resulted in the most material 
advancement in history, whose were the first of their kind and today enjoy the most emulation, then in 
that sense the Enlightenment, despite the erosion of its original vision and despite the shakiness of some 
of its premises, has been the principal inspiration not just of Western high culture but, increasingly, of the 
entire world." The originators of the Enlightenment, Wilson tells us (pp. 21-22), "shared a passion to 
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possibilities, the question which constitutes the title of this lecture reveals itself as a 
kind of meta-question concerning Indian philosophy. It is in fact a question about what 
the very existence of Indian philosophy means from the perspective of human history in 
general. 
 The question as to how and why rational philosophy arose in India has a 
parallel: how and why did rational philosophy arise in Greece? Unlike the previous one, 
[13] this question has received a fair amount of attention in scholarly literature. It seems 
clear that the sudden rise of scientific knowledge and philosophy in ancient Greece had 
much to do with the prevailing custom of critical discussion, and of convincing others 
of one's own point of view,19 which was linked to the particular political situation 
prevalent in ancient Greece. Geoffrey Lloyd, who is doing important work in the study 
of the origin and development of Greek science and philosophy, has drawn attention in 
his book Magic, Reason and Experience (1979) to the parallelism which exists between 
two important features. One is the way in which in Greece, from the sixth century 
B.C.E. onward, the questions of how society should be regulated and of the merits and 
demerits of different kinds of constitutions came to be a subject for open — and not 
merely theoretical — discussion. The other is the prominent characteristic of Greek 
speculative thought to be able to challenge deeply held assumptions about ‘nature’ and 
to debate such issues as the origin of the world. He then observes (p. 249): "In some 
respects we appear to be dealing not just with two analogous developments, but with 
two aspects of the same development." Having supported and illustrated this 
observation in various ways, he states (p. 255): "Where the topic of how the state 
should be governed could be debated openly by the citizen body as a whole, there were, 
we may presume, fewer inhibitions — at least in some quarters — to challenging deep-
seated assumptions and beliefs about ‘natural phenomena’, the gods or the origin or 
order of things." It is noteworthy to what extent the features most characteristic of what 
I have proposed to call a tradition of rational inquiry — primarily free and uninhibited 
discussion of all issues even in areas which might encroach upon other sources of 
authority — appear to be intimately linked to the political situation of Greece at that 
time. It is precisely inhibitions, the fear to encroach on such other sources of authority, 
                                                                                                                                         
demystify the world and free the mind from the impersonal forces that imprison it", they "resisted 
organized religion [and] despised revelation and dogma". 
 As Tilmann Vetter reminds me, there are many forms of (Western) philosophy which have in no 
way contributed to the development of modern science. Allan Grapard, similarly, draws my attention to 
the fact that an important part of Western philosophy may not be representative of a tradition of rational 
inquiry, and that the term philosophy in the title of this lecture is therefore used in a somewhat restricted 
sense.  
19 See, e.g.,Vernant, 1962; Lloyd, 1979: ch. 4; 1987: 78 f. Cp. also Popper, 1959: 149 f.; Lloyd, 1991: 
100-120. Jullien (1995) points out the extent to which confrontation, a common feature of ancient Greek 
political and military life, was conducive to the development of rationality, whereas ancient China, which 
avoided confrontation, did not develop this feature. 
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which would seem to prevent traditions of rational debate and inquiry from coming 
about in the majority of human societies.20 
[14] 
Before turning to the question how philosophy arose in ancient India, I would like to 
give an example of the Indian tradition of rational inquiry at work. My example is a 
concrete illustration of how an unwillingness to accept a traditional truth at its face 
value, without rational, i.e. critical, understanding, brought about two major changes in 
doctrine in two important schools of thought. It concerns the belief in the efficacy of 
acts, right across the boundaries of death and rebirth into another life. Good acts bring 
good results to their perpetrator, bad acts bad results. This belief was shared by most of 
the thinkers of classical India. It also posed a problem. How exactly can acts bring 
about such results in a distant future, perhaps in a different part of the world, or in a dif-
ferent world altogether? What mechanism makes this possible?21 
 One school of Brahmanical philosophy that worried about these questions is the 
one called Vaiße∑ika. Its reflections passed through three stages. The earliest stage is 
represented by the Vaiße∑ika SËtra, the oldest surviving text of this school. This text 
apparently had no solution to the problem. One of its sections uses the expression ad®∑†a 
— which means "the unseen", probably in the sense of "the invisible" — which refers 
to the "invisible" results and purposes of ritual and ethical activities, as well as the 
terms "merit" (dharma) and "demerit" (adharma).22 We must assume that these names 
were used in connection with a process which no one as yet claimed to understand. 
 The second stage is represented by the Ka†and¥, a commentary on the Vaiße∑ika 
SËtra that is now lost, but fragments of which have survived in citations by other [15] 
authors.23 Activities are thought of as producing merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma). 
                                                
20 Joseph Needham's question ("What were the inhibiting factors in Chinese civilisation which prevented 
a rise of modern science in Asia analogous to that which took place in Europe since the 16th century 
onwards ...?" cited in Wulff, 1998: 9) may therefore find an at least partial answer in the absence of a 
tradition of rational inquiry in China. Wulff (1998: 63) proposes another answer ("Die Chinesen hatten 
einfach nicht die spezifischen historischen Voraussetzungen dafür, deren Verkettung die Entwicklung in 
Europa bewirkte") and enumerates thirteen factors that played an important role in the development of 
European science; this approach would seem to beg the question. 
 Lloyd makes the following observation with regard to classical Chinese philosophy (1990: 125-
26): "clearly insofar as the ideas a philosopher produced were directed at a ruler whom he was hoping to 
influence, and insofar as the ruler himself was the final arbiter of the value of those ideas, those factors 
may well have imposed certain constraints on the ideas considered worth putting forward, constraints that 
may be thought to have inhibited, if not excluded, the development both of radical solutions to problems 
and of theoretical, abstract, impractical ones". For a comparative analysis of early Chinese and Greek 
thought in relation to their different social and political backgrounds, see Collins, 1998: 146 f. 
21 The following examples are taken from an as yet unpublished study Karma and teleology: a problem 
and its solutions in Indian philosophy (Bronkhorst, 2000a). Other developments of doctrine inspired by 
different intellectual challenges are discussed in Bronkhorst, 1999a. 
22 Halbfass, 1991: 311-312. The section concerned is VS(C) 6.2.1 ff. 
23 For our present purposes esp. Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtrabhå∑ya on sËtra 2.2.12 is of interest; cp. 
Bronkhorst, 1996; further 1993. 
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Merit and demerit are here looked upon as items in the list of existing things; the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra had not yet recognized them as such. More in particular, merit and de-
merit are looked upon as qualities of the soul, which is a substance. Being qualities, 
they inhere in their substance, the soul, and are in a way inseparable from it, just as a 
color is inseparable from the substance to which it belongs. This close connection 
continues until retribution takes place. Since each soul is believed to be an omnipresent 
substance, its merits and demerits can be imagined to exert an influence on things that 
are not at the same place as the person — more precisely: not at the same place as the 
body of the person — to whom they belong; the fact that the soul is immortal and that 
merits and demerits stick to it until retribution, explains that the effects of deeds can 
take place long after the deeds themselves. In this same way the deeds of living beings, 
through the intermediary of their merits and demerits, can and do determine each new 
creation of the world. The omnipresent souls are in contact (saµyoga) with the atoms in 
which their merits and demerits induce activities at the moment of creation.24 Thus 
deeds determine the body, the sense organs and the amount of happiness or pain with 
which one will be connected, as well as the objects which one will encounter.25 
 We may agree that the mechanism of karmic retribution has gained somewhat in 
intelligibility this way, but obviously much remains to be desired. Most importantly, 
how do the in themselves unconscious qualities merit and demerit arrange the material 
world in such a way that a good person derives pleasant experiences from it and a bad 
person unpleasant experiences? The further development of the school shows that the 
Vaiße∑ikas themselves were not altogether happy with their solution. How did they 
solve the situation? 
[16] 
 The Padårthadharmasa∫graha of Praßastapåda, a Vaiße∑ika work belonging to 
the sixth century of the common era, introduces, apparently for the first time in the 
history of Vaiße∑ika, the notion of an omniscient and omnipotent creator God. A close 
inspection of the passages dealing with this God shows that his most important task by 
far is that of guiding the process of karmic retribution. The supreme God, or more 
precisely the somewhat lower god he creates and then puts in charge of the world 
period concerned, knows the effects of the deeds of living beings, and with the help of 
that creates living beings in accordance with their past deeds. 
                                                
24 WI p. 10 § 58: ... sarvåtmagatav®ttilabdhåd®∑†åpek∑ebhyas tatsaµyogebhya˙ pavanaparamåˆu∑u 
karmotpattau ... . 
25 WI p. 65-66 § 318: avidu∑o rågadve∑avata˙ pravartakåd dharmåt prak®∑†åt svalpådharmasahitåd 
brahmendraprajåpatipit®manu∑yaloke∑v åßayånurËpair i∑†aßar¥rendriyavi∑ayasukhådibhir yogo bhavati/ 
tathå prak®∑†åd adharmåt svalpadharmasahitåt pretatiryagyonisthåne∑v 
ani∑†aßar¥rendriyavi∑ayadu˙khådibhir yogo bhavati/ evaµ prav®ttilak∑aˆåd dharmåd adharmasahitåd 
devamanu∑yatirya∫nårake∑u puna˙ puna˙ saµsårabandho bhavati/. The commentators Ír¥dhara and 
Vyomaßiva explain the expression åßayånurËpa as karmånurËpa. 
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 In this way the problem of the mechanism of karmic retribution is solved, but at 
a price. Instead of the initial problem of teleology, we now have a creator God, whose 
power of purposeful action is assumed as a given. The problem is in this way reduced 
to one concerning God's psychology. Vaiße∑ika was not indifferent to the question of 
the teleological dimension of human psychology, which they tried to solve along lines 
similar to those known from modern behaviorism. It is however hard to see how the 
human psychology of the school could explain God's purposeful behavior in agreement 
with the law of karmic retribution. But whatever else we may think of the introduction 
of a creator God in order to explain karmic retribution, it is not always sufficiently 
appreciated that this development was inspired by rational considerations, by an intel-
lectual need, not, or not only or even primarily, by religious developments of the time. 
Briefly put, the thinkers of the Vaiße∑ika school had tried to solve the puzzle of explain-
ing teleological action in terms of proximate causes, and had failed. They were almost 
bound to fail; the puzzle remains a central concern to philosophers and scientists even 
today. 
 Another prominent Indian thinker, somewhat earlier than Praßastapåda, is 
Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu belonged to an altogether different current of thought. He 
was a Buddhist, and his philosophy differed in numerous respects from that of 
Praßastapåda. Vasubandhu, too, was perplexed by the same problem, that of the 
mechanism of karmic retribution. He too opted for a radical solution, but one quite 
different from Praßastapåda's. The most bewildering side of karmic retribution is that 
residues of deeds, which are somehow stored in the mind, have in due course an effect 
on the material world. Vasubandhu avoided this difficulty by stating that they don't. 
Deeds, their residues, and their results are in the end mere mental events. This implies, 
of course, that Vasubandhu chose for idealism, on the grounds that only thus karmic 
retribution would become intelligible. 
[17] 
 Some scholars hold the view that idealism entered Indian Buddhist thought 
inspired by certain meditative experiences.26 Idealism had indeed been around for a 
while when Vasubandhu, too, converted to it. There is however no indication that I 
know of that Vasubandhu turned to it on the basis of meditative experience. Quite on 
the contrary, he came to accept it, as we have seen, in order to make karmic retribution 
intelligible, i.e. on the basis of critical reflection. The arguments that have been adduced 
to show that the earliest Buddhist idealists, Vasubandhu's predecessors, based their 
convictions on meditative experience are not water-proof. The texts concerned are not 
without ambiguity in this respect, but they are compatible with the view that already the 
                                                
26 See Schmithausen, 1973; 1976. 
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earliest Buddhist idealists had arrived at their position in order to make a better 
understanding of karmic retribution possible. This point cannot be elaborated here, but 
has been dealt with in a separate study.27 
 Both Praßastapåda and Vasubandhu took radical decisions which were to be 
heavy of consequences for the further development of Indian thought. They did so be-
cause they saw no other way to account for a dogma which they accepted as certain: the 
dogma of karmic retribution. The developments they initiated, or continued, may not 
appear to us, at first sight, to be typical of rational thought. A close inspection of their 
words and intellectual surroundings however reveals that they were. That is to say, they 
were responses to a challenge that confronted these two thinkers. 
 These examples illustrate the extent to which the Indian tradition of rational 
inquiry had to deal with problems of its own, and arrived at solutions that deviate 
sometimes profoundly from what we are accustomed to in the West. It is for this reason 
justified to speak in India of an independent tradition, independent of the philosophies 
that developed in ancient Greece and in the parts of the world influenced by them. 
 
Now I come to the central question of this lecture: how and why did philosophy — i.e. 
systematic philosophy — arise in India? Having noted the link between the sudden rise 
of a tradition of rational inquiry in ancient Greece on the one hand, and the 
accompanying political situation on the other, one is tempted to look for a similar 
political situation in ancient India as well. Unfortunately this procedure holds [18] little 
promise. We are not at all sure that anything like the Greek city-state ever existed in 
ancient India.28 
                                                
27 Bronkhorst, 2000a: § 11. 
28 Vijay Kumar Thakur (1981: 250) states: "we are not sure whether commercial towns on Athenian 
pattern existed in India or not. It is possible that some towns in the Punjab, which the Greeks called 
‘independent towns’, were similar types of commercial towns along the roads leading from India through 
the Punjab to Iran. This would mean that they had a completely different type of administrative 
machinery [from other towns in India]. Although we have no details of the administration of such towns, 
it can be presumed that their administrative system in a way tallied with the administration of large tribal 
oligarchies. The city administration, basically oligarchical in nature, might have carried the business of 
the town through discussion." On the independent towns here mentioned see further Bongard-Levin, 
1986: 67 f. Thakur continues (p. 250-52): "Till the Mauryan period, the guilds were solely concerned 
with their economic activities while exercising some authority over their members. The situation, 
however, changed in the post-Mauryan times. A very important, and rather novel, development in the 
polity of this period was the emergence of almost autonomous governments in at least a dozen cities of 
northern India in the second and first centuries B.C. The administration of these cities was evidently in 
the hands of the guilds. Guilds of traders belonging to these cities issued copper coins, which is ordinarily 
done by the ruling power, for it is an important insignia of sovereignty. At least in five pre-Indo-Greek 
coins, the term nigama is clearly mentioned; four out of them bear the names of the different quarters of 
Taxila. Yet another coin found from Taxila records the term pañchanigama (sic). ... A somewhat similar 
practice seems to have prevailed at Kaußåmb¥ also, for it is known as nigama on one of its coins. Coins of 
the guild of the gandhikas, literally meaning perfumers but really general merchants,a have also been 
found in the region around Kaußåmb¥. ... Such coins representing certain cities are not to be found from 
the latter half of the 1st century B.C. This possibly indicates that with the establishment of the 
Såtavåhanas and the Ku∑åˆa kingdoms in the first two centuries of the Christian era, these towns lost their 
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 We are here confronted with the problem of accounting for the appearance of a 
tradition of rational inquiry in India. If traditions of rational inquiry are not the kind of 
things that appear automatically and inevitably wherever some minimum conditions are 
satisfied, then what was responsible for the appearance of such a tradition in India? The 
question is not easy to answer, not least because of the scarcity of documents for the 
period that seems most relevant in this connection. We enter [19] therefore into a realm 
of speculation, or at best informed guesses. The importance of the problem leaves us 
however no alternative but to go ahead. 
 What do we know about the early history of systematic philosophy in India? Not 
very much. Of the two main schools of early Brahmanical philosophy, Såµkhya and 
Vaiße∑ika, the first one obviously had its roots in a pre-systematic period. The classical 
school of Såµkhya preserves the traces of that earlier phase, and has the greatest 
difficulties to improve the system in such a way that it becomes more or less coherent 
and resistant against outside criticism. Its efforts are only partially successful, and the 
school slowly disappears from view in the second half of the first millennium. 
 The other early Brahmanical school, Vaiße∑ika, is quite different. Scholarly 
attempts to identify its pre-classical and pre-systematic roots lead nowhere, and it seems 
likely that it was created as a coherent system. An in-depth comparison with the 
Buddhist philosophy current in the early centuries of the common era shows that, in 
spite of numerous differences, the two share a number of fundamental positions. More 
precisely, they share some positions, while in some other respects they hold positions 
which are each other's mirror images. No such similarity exists between the Såµkhya 
philosophy and either the Buddhist or the Vaiße∑ika system. It is not possible in this 
lecture to elaborate these observations by providing details. The situation is however 
remarkable enough to justify the conclusion that, most probably, the Vaiße∑ika system 
was created in response to the particular system of Buddhist philosophy — called 
Sarvåstivåda — to which it is in some respects so close.29  
 This conclusion, though tentative, suggests that the original impulse for the 
development of Indian rational philosophy came from Buddhism. This is fortunate, 
because a considerable number of Buddhist texts from around and before the beginning 
of the common era have been preserved. Many of these texts do not contain anything 
resembling the kind of rational philosophy we are looking for, but some do. In order to 
                                                                                                                                         
autonomous character ..." Ahmad Hasan Dani (1986: 58 ff.) expresses reservations with regard to this 
interpretation of nigama (which goes back to D.R. Bhandarkar); see further Thapar, 1992: 96; 
Chakrabarti, 1995: 311; Ray, 1994: 20, 192. Ray (1986: 49) observes that "numismatic evidence suggests 
that after the fall of the Mauryas several cities acquired power and issued their own die-struck coins"; she 
mentions Mahi∑mati, Tripuri, and Tagara or Ter in particular. 
a On the role of aromas and perfumes in early trade, see Donkin, 1999: ch. 1, esp. p. 15 f. 
29 See Bronkhorst, 1992. 
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properly appreciate this, let me briefly and schematically describe how Buddhism had 
developed after the disappearance of its founder. Attempts had been made to preserve 
his words, both regarding the appropriate behavior of monks and nuns (vinaya) and his 
teaching in a narrower sense (sËtra). Besides this, efforts were made to distill the most 
important ideas and concepts from his teaching; this gave rise to lists of so-called 
dharmas, which were elaborately [20] ordered and commented upon in the texts of the 
Abhidharma-Pi†aka, "the basket of things relating to the teaching". Two collections of 
texts bearing this name have been preserved in their entirety, belonging to two different 
Buddhist schools: the Abhidharma-Pi†aka of the Theravåda school, and the one 
belonging to the Sarvåstivåda school. 
 A closer study reveals important differences between these two collections.30 
The most important difference for our present purposes is the presence in the 
Sarvåstivåda basket of a new way of ordering and classifying the dharmas; this is called 
pañcavastuka. Before the introduction of the pañcavastuka, and in the Theravåda texts 
all along, the dharmas were classified with the help of a schematization which was 
believed to derive from the Buddha himself, but which was unsatisfactory and even 
problematic in various respects. From a historical point of view the difficulties 
connected with this earlier schematization are easy to explain: the idea of enumerating 
and classifying dharmas had arisen well after the disappearance of the Buddha, and 
searching among his words for schemes to classify them was bound to fail. 
 The new classification, the pañcavastuka, brought some amount of reason and 
coherence into Sarvåstivåda scholasticism. Moreover, this development was 
accompanied by others, which together changed the initial attempt to preserve the 
concepts taught by the Buddha into that of creating a coherent system of philosophy. 
For reasons that cannot be presented at this moment the list of dharmas became a list of 
all there is. Moreover, from an original doctrine of no-self the conclusion was drawn 
that no composite objects exist. The Buddha's words to the extent that everything is 
impermanent and therefore painful, came to imply that everything is momentary and 
exists just one moment. New dharmas were introduced whose primary task it was to 
make the thus created ontological scheme coherent and intelligible. In brief, the 
Sarvåstivåda school of Buddhism underwent a process of rationalization. The 
Theravåda school, on the other hand, did not undergo any such development. 
 How do we explain this difference between Sarvåstivåda and Theravåda? This 
question invites an easy, almost obvious, answer, once we take into account where and 
when the Sarvåstivådins worked and lived. Sarvåstivåda belonged to the North-West of 
                                                
30 This and the following paragraphs are based on the chapter "Die Ordnung der Lehre" in Bronkhorst, 
2000: 76 ff. 
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the Indian subcontinent, i.e., Gandhåra and the surrounding regions.31 Theravåda, on the 
other hand, belonged before its emigration to Sri Lanka to an [21] area more to the 
south; Vidißå has been suggested.32 There are reasons to believe that the first 
Sarvåstivåda or proto-Sarvåstivåda attempts at systematizing took place in or before the 
middle of the second century before our era.33 During this period there was a Hellenistic 
kingdom in northwestern India, a leftover from the conquests of Alexander the Great. 
We know from elsewhere that Hellenistic kings used to cultivate philosophy and liked 
to be surrounded by wise men at their courts, with whom discussions took place.34 
Archaeological excavations in Afghanistan, where the Greeks' capital has been 
identified, confirm that this was the case here, too. Not only has a Greek philosophical 
papyrus been found;35 it even appears that Clearchus of Soloi, a direct pupil of 
Aristotle, visited the place.36 
 Was there any interaction between the Greeks and the Buddhists? This is a priori 
likely in view of the fact that Buddhism is, or at any rate was at that time, a 
proselytizing religion, which would not shun contact with people adhering to other 
beliefs or traditions. This openness to other traditions seems confirmed by the 
circumstance that the Buddhist art from Gandhåra shows strong Hellenistic influence.37 
Influence took also place in other areas of culture, though probably later.38 Did the 
Greeks, then, enter into discussion with the Buddhists? It [22] is tempting to think that 
they did, and that the Greek tradition of rational debate obliged the Buddhists to rethink 
                                                
31 Cp. Willemen et al., 1998: 36 ff. ("History and Sarvåstivåda"); 149 ff.; Salomon, 1999: 5 f. 
32 Frauwallner, 1956: 18. 
33 Bronkhorst, 1987, esp. p. 64 f.; 1995; cp. 1995a. It is not clear when exactly Sarvåstivåda as an 
identifiable school came into existence; cp. Willemen et al., 1998: 147 f. 
34 Préaux, 1978: 212-238. Cp. Avi-Yonah, 1978: 50 ff. ("Hellenistic monarchy in its relations to 
philosophy, poetry, religion"). 
35 Rapin, 1992: 115-121. Karttunen (1997: 268 f.) points out that the Aßokan edicts in Greek show some 
knowledge of Greek philosophical terminology. 
36 Robert, 1973: 207-237; Rapin, 1992: 128, 389; Karttunen, 1997: 99, 288. If it is true that the Neo-
Pythagorean Apollonios of Tyana visited Taxila in or around 44 C.E. (cp. Lamotte, 1958: 518 f.; 
Karttunen, 1997: 7 f., 306 n. 295; B.N. Mukherjee arrives at 46 C.E., see Dani, 1986: 69), one might be 
tempted to conclude that an interest in Hellenistic philosophy still existed at that time in North-West 
India. Dani (1986: 70) speaks about "the preference that the ruling elite [of Taxila] had for Hellenistic 
models" during this period. However, "on the spiritual side, it is Buddhism that dominated" (ibid.). 
37 Cp. Lamotte, 1958: 469-487, where also other forms of Greek influence on Buddhism are discussed. 
See also Nehru, 1989, with further references. It is to be kept in mind that the surviving Buddhist art from 
Gandhåra is more recent than the Hellenistic kingdom mentioned above; see Fussman, 1987. At the same 
time, "Gandhåran art can no longer be considered Indo-Roman, not after Surkh Kotal and other 
excavations in Bactria" (Karttunen, 1997: 278, with references to further literature). See further Posch, 
1995. 
38 Most notably on Indian astronomy; see Pingree, 1978, esp. vol. I, p. 3 f. Equally important might be 
that the Indo-Greeks may have started an era in India; see Paolo Daffinà, 1988: 55 f.; Karttunen, 1997: 
296. See also Thundy, 1993: 256 f. In a paper read in the panel "New Discovery of Early Buddhist 
Manuscripts" at the XIIth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (August 1999, 
Lausanne) Jens-Uwe Hartmann pointed out that Buddhist texts written in Greek script have been found in 
Afghanistan. 
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their positions. We have already seen that the Sarvåstivåda texts of that period and 
region show that their positions were indeed subjected to a thorough revision. But is 
there any evidence that supports the idea that the Greek tradition of debate may have 
played a role here? 
 There is. A Buddhist text has been preserved which purports to record a discus-
sion between a Buddhist monk and the Indo-Greek king Menander. It has rightly been 
observed that "there is little in the text which is Greek, aside from the name of the 
king".39 Yet the very existence of such a text — I am speaking of "The Questions of 
King Milinda" (Milindapañha in Påli), which has been preserved in Påli and in Chinese 
translation40 — allows us to conclude that Greeks and Buddhists discussed religious and 
related issues, or at the very least that the Buddhists of that region remembered the 
Greeks as participants in debates. It is not adventurous to conclude that the Greeks may 
have exerted an influence on the Sarvåstivåda Buddhists, quite simply by engaging 
them in debates.41 This conclusion seems confirmed by the fact that a number of Greeks 
appear to have converted to Buddhism.42  
 Let me repeat here that no Greek ideas have ever been shown to be part of 
Sarvåstivåda Buddhist thought, nor indeed of any other school of Indian philosophy. 
But we are at present not talking about ideas, but about the way people deal with them. 
What I propose is that the Buddhists of North-West India adopted the [23] method of 
rational debate and inquiry from the Greeks. They adopted this method and along with 
it the willingness (or obligation) to use it in areas that used to be the exclusive territory 
of tradition and religion, but they adopted nothing else in the domain of philosophy. 
This method alone, however, was able to affect their ideas profoundly. It forced them to 
rethink their intellectual and religious heritage, and organize it in a way so as to make it 
more coherent and more resistant to critical questioning by outsiders. 
                                                
39 Halbfass, 1988: 19. The original of the two preserved Chinese translations of this text presented 
probably Sarvåstivåda doctrines; vgl. Lamotte, 1958: 465; Demiéville, 1924: 74. 
40 It would be more correct to speak of a Milinda corpus, various versions of which have been identified. 
Peter Skilling (1998: 92 f.) observes that this corpus was more varied and extensive than previously 
thought, and lists the known versions. 
41 Note that the influence was not exerted by the Milindapañha itself. Quite on the contrary, it appears 
that the Greeks exerted a direct influence on the Buddhists through contacts and discussions, not (or not 
primarily) through texts. The question as to why the Chinese, who translated the Milindapañha into their 
own language, were not influenced by this text is therefore besides the point. 
42 The Påli Mahåvaµsa states "that at the Foundation Ceremony of the Mahå ThËpa [in Anurådhapura], 
thirty thousand monks, under Yona-Mahådhammarakkhita, came from Alasandå in the Yona country" 
(DPPN II p. 699 s.v. Yonå). Alasandå refers no doubt to one of the cities called Alexandria founded by 
Alexander the Great, this one in present-day Afghanistan (Ai Khanum? Kandahar?; cp. Karttunen, 1997: 
279, 281). Karttunen (1997: 297; cp. 1994: 331) refers to a Nagarjunakonda cave inscription of the third 
century C.E. mentioning the Yavanas among peoples having converted to Buddhism. These and other 
inscriptions do not necessarily refer to Greeks (cp. Ray, 1994: 84; 1988), but Karttunen observes (1994: 
332): "It is ... true that with confidence the Yona/Yavana can be only connected with Greeks in the 
earliest inscriptions, but to me it seems quite likely that in all our cases the word is somehow related to 
the Greeks." 
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 Once the tradition of rational inquiry had been established, it was apparently 
capable of continuing on its own,43 and even spread all over India, independently and 
also after the disappearance of the Greeks from northwestern India. We know from later 
sources that debates were frequently organized by kings in classical India, and it is clear 
that these later debates followed, at least in theory, the canons of rationality. 
 
What about the Upani∑ads? Don't they contain philosophy?44 The old Upani∑ads, 
whatever their exact dates, certainly predate the second century preceding the common 
era, and even Alexander's invasion of India. When these Upani∑ads were composed, 
there was no Greek in sight. How then can it be seriously maintained that Indian 
philosophy owes its origin in a way to the presence of Greeks in North-West India? 
[24] 
 Two things must be distinguished here. As I said before, the contents of 
classical Indian philosophy are, as far as I can see, completely Indian. The Buddhists 
who came in contact with the Greeks in North-West India did not borrow any elements 
of Greek philosophy; no such element has been identified in their thought, in spite of 
the frequency with which the question must have been raised by earlier Indologists with 
a European classical background. The same applies to Brahmanical philosophies: they 
originated and developed on Indian soil, some with the intent to explain the contents of 
the Upani∑ads. No influence from elsewhere has so far been demonstrated in any of 
them. 
 At the same time, the available evidence suggests that no tradition of rational 
inquiry (in the sense here intended, manifested by critical debate and attempts to create 
coherent views of reality) existed in India before the period we are considering. Vedic 
literature, and this includes the Upani∑ads, has no tendency to develop coherent 
                                                
43 This is less surprising than it may seem. Human conformity, and the possibility of forming traditions 
and fashions which it entails, has been studied from a biological / game theoretical point of view by Boyd 
and Richerson (1990); see further Ridley, 1996: 180 f. Simon (1990) emphasizes the importance of what 
he calls human docility. One might also say that rational inquiry had become a meme, and as such part of 
a ‘memeplex’, a cooperative cartel of mutually assisting memes, each providing an environment which 
favours the others; for recent descriptions of this characterization of a culture see Dennett, 1995: 342 f.; 
Blackmore, 1999. Perhaps the fact that Indian society allowed different points of view (such as the 
Brahmanical and the Buddhist) to exist side by side can be interpreted in the sense that social bonding 
was relatively loose or to some extent cognitively neutral (cp. Munz, 1985: 75, 160 f., 280 f.; 1993: 171), 
which may have helped the tradition of rational inquiry to survive for some time. It seems however more 
probable that rational inquiry — or rather the obligation to accept and deal with criticism — itself had 
become a social constraint to which thought had to submit, a social bond or ‘ethnic marker’ characteristic 
of the relevant layer / subgroup of classical Indian society. 
44 Michaels (1998: 47) writes: "Noch immer liest man, dass etwa die Bråhmaˆa-Texte ein magisches 
Weltbild vertreten, das von der angeblich philosophischen Sichtweise der Upani∑aden abgelöst worden 
sei, als ob nicht nach wie vor in Indien ein ‘magisches’ neben einem ‘philosophischen’ Weltbild stünde." 
As pointed out above, the kind of ‘philosophy’ considered in this lecture does not exist always and 
everywhere. 
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systems.45 These texts do value knowledge, that is to say, a certain kind of knowledge.46 
Rationality, on the other hand, is conspicuous by its absence. It is true that the 
Bråhmaˆas and Upani∑ads record a number of famous debates, but these cannot in any 
way be called rational. In fact, they constitute school examples of the very opposite. No 
one, in these debates, is ever convinced by the arguments of his opponent. The winner 
of a debate, as Walter Ruben pointed out long ago (1928), is not the one who knows 
better, but the one who knows more.47 Logical argumentation is completely absent. 
Apodictic statements are accepted without resistance. Indeed, the teacher need not 
present arguments in support of his teaching, because the very idea that he might by 
mistake teach something that is incorrect does not seem to have occurred to the thinkers 
of the Upani∑ads. Every thought is correct, but it may be insufficient, and may therefore 
have to be subordinated to the knowledge of the winner. Asking too many questions, on 
the other hand, can have dire results. Depending on the interpretation one puts upon the 
expression concerned, one's head may be shattered, or one may loose one's head in a 
physically less violent manner.48 As to the problem why simple questioning may carry 
such grave consequences for the unsuccessful participant, Michael Witzel (1987: 409) 
reminds us that the Vedic examples all deal [25] with knowledge which is "secret" in 
one way or another: it may be known only to an eminent person, a teacher who will not 
pass it on readily even when he is questioned, or it is known to a class of ritual 
specialists who will not share their esoteric knowledge with rival groups. All this is not 
of course conducive to the creation of coherent systems of thought. 
 Witzel has also drawn attention to the many similarities that exist between the 
Upani∑adic debates and those recorded in the early Buddhist texts. There are differ-
ences, too, to be sure.49 But, as in the case of the late-Vedic texts, there is no question 
                                                
45 This is not to say that the Vedic authors did not think, or were not interested in reasons. A. Wezler, in 
a paper read at the Second International Vedic Workshop, Kyoto University, October-November 1999 
("Modes of reporting opinions in Vedic prose") draws attention to the fact that the Bråhmaˆas are 
predominantly concerned with presenting reasons for individual steps of ritual activity. Wezler also 
points out that differences of opinion, too, are also recorded; for some examples see Bronkhorst, 2002. 
46 The remainder of this paragraph also occurs, in slightly different form, in Bronkhorst, 2001a. 
47 Cf. Lloyd, 1979: 60-61; 1987: 87-88; Bronkhorst, 2002. 
48 See Witzel, 1987, and Insler, 1990. 
49 Cf. Manné, 1992. In the discussion between the Buddha and the Jaina Saccaka (CËÒasaccakasutta, 
Majjhima Nikåya no. 35), to take an example, there is an undeniable confrontation of ideas, and the 
Buddha does not hesitate to point out a contradiction in the speech of his adversary: "Pay attention, 
Aggivessana. When you have paid attention, Aggivessana, answer. For your last speech does not agree 
with your first, nor your first with your last" (MN I.232: manasikarohi Aggivessana, manasikaritvå kho 
Aggivessana byåkarohi, na kho te sandh¥yati purimena vå pacchimaµ pacchimena vå purimaµ; tr. 
Horner, 1954: 285). See also Jayatilleke, 1963: 205-276 ("The attitude to reason"); Watanabe, 1983: 69 
ff. ("The development of the dialogue form"). Elsewhere members of other religious currents are 
described as "clever, skilful, practised in disputing with others, hair-splitters" (e.g. DN I.26: santi hi kho 
pana samaˆabråhmaˆå paˆ∂itå nipuˆå kataparappavådå vålavedhirËpå vobhindantå maññe caranti 
paññågatena di††higatåni). 
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here of elaborating coherent systems of thought,50 which suggests that these early 
Buddhist debates were primarily meant for internal consumption, and that no need was 
felt to immunize the own position against criticism. We have seen that the elaboration 
of coherent systems of thought belongs to a later phase of development of Buddhism. 
 I am aware that delicate questions remain unanswered for the moment. Critics 
will no doubt ask whether I am serious in placing the grammarian Påˆini — whose 
grammar has been described as "one of the greatest monuments of human intelligence" 
— in a pre-rational period of India's intellectual history. Påˆini, who appears to have 
lived in the second half of the fourth century B.C.E. or later,51 may have predated [26] 
Alexander's invasion, but this is not certain.52 Greek influence in his case is not 
impossible, but less likely.53 
 We should not be led astray by such terms as ‘rational’, ‘pre-rational’, and the 
like. The former is no compliment, the latter no criticism. I have already pointed out 
that the absence of a tradition of rational inquiry as meant here has nothing to do with 
stupidity or backwardness. People do not become more intelligent by being part of such 
a tradition. What changes is first of all their attitude. In a tradition of rational inquiry as 
here envisaged thinkers accept — have to accept — the legitimacy of questions and 
criticism directed even at convictions endorsed by tradition, revelation or insight. For 
wide-ranging philosophical systems to develop, such an attitude may be essential. We 
have seen how the Vaiße∑ika philosophy introduced the notion of a creator God to solve 
a systemic problem. Other texts of the same school do not hesitate to reduce this God to 
an element that fits into its ontology. In the case of Påˆini there was, as far as we can 
tell, no need to be questioning and critical with regard to his tradition. Quite on the 
contrary, his grammar may have to be looked upon as an elaboration and 
systematization of the traditional understanding of language. It testifies to the 
intelligence of its creator, not to the tradition of rational inquiry to which he may or may 
                                                
50 Richard F. Gombrich (1996: 18) points out that "the Buddha was continually arguing ad hominem and 
adapting what he said to the language of his interlocutor" and concludes that "this must have had 
enormous implications for the consistency, or rather the inconsistency, of his mode of expression". 
Whether or not this conclusion is correct, it seems clear that the method of arguing recorded in the early 
Buddhist texts is hardly conducive to the elaboration of coherent systems of thought. 
51 Hinüber, 1990: 34; Falk, 1993: 304. Various scholars prefer to stick to earlier estimations of Påˆini's 
date, but without evidence; see Werba, 1997: 137 with note 64, with references to earlier scholars whose 
opinions are equally unsupported. On the tendency to assign early dates to Vedic, including late-Vedic, 
literature, see Bronkhorst, 1989. 
52 Karttunen, 1989: 142-146; 1997: 12 with note 49. 
53 In the case of Patañjali, on the other hand, there is evidence that he had undergone the influence of 
post-pañcavastuka Buddhism, and therefore, if the hypothesis presented in this lecture is accepted, at least 
indirectly that of the Greeks; cp. Bronkhorst, 1987; 1995. 
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not have belonged. I could say more about this issue, but will leave it at this for the 
moment.54 
 I wish to return to the meta-level of our discussion. The preceding reflections 
suggest that both Indian and Western systematic philosophy derive one vital element 
from a common source.55 This vital element — viz., rational inquiry and analysis — 
would, moreover, seem to be absent everywhere else in the history of mankind except, 
of course, in developments that derive from the Greek and the Indian traditions. This 
suggests that a tradition of rational debate and inquiry has been able to establish itself 
independently only once in the history of mankind. If we add to this that, as I pointed 
out earlier, the modern world might never have become what it is without the presence 
of a tradition of rational inquiry which is so essential to modern science, we are 
confronted with a troubling question. Is it a historical accident that humanity has arrived 
at its present state, characterized on the one hand [27] by hitherto unsuspected powers, 
and at the same time threatened by their consequences?56 
 The days in which the history of life on earth was looked upon as an 
unstoppable march forward to ever more advanced degrees of complexity and 
intelligence have come to an end.57 Scientists point out that the appearance of human 
beings was no more than a historical accident,58 that the development of a high degree 
of intelligence, whether in human or other living beings, was by no means the inevitable 
consequence of biological evolution.59 They also point out that once intelligent human 
                                                
54 See further Bronkhorst, 1982: 280-281. 
55 Frits Staal (1999) argues that Greek and Vedic mathematics have a common source, which is not 
however to be looked for in either Greece or India, but in the common “homeland” of the Indian and 
ancient Near Eastern Indo-European languages, which was situated “in the steppes along the Oxus river, 
now called the Amu Darya, which separates Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the area east of the Caspian 
Sea or Bactria and Margiana as they were called in classical times” (p. 109). This hypothesis is to be 
distinguished from the one presented here, and is indeed quite independent of it. 
56 Cp. Lloyd, 1979: 258: "Ancient Greece is marked not just by exceptional intellectual developments, 
but also by what is in certain respects an exceptional political situation: and the two appear to be 
connected." 
57 On the idea of progress in human society, see Bronk, 1998. 
58 Also the appearance of animal life — given the presence of microbial life — is exceedingly 
improbable according to Ward and Brownlee, 2000. 
59 Gould, 1996; Diamond, 1991: 184-195. Cp. Deacon, 1997: 410: "Our uniquely human minds are, in a 
very concrete sense, the products of an unusual reproductive challenge that only symbolic reference was 
able to address — a concrete internalization of an ancient and persisting social evolutionary predicament 
that is uniquely human." See further Stanley, 1996: 215: "our genus was born of an environmental crisis 
[the Ice Age], which means that it might never have been born at all. ... [T]he accidental nature of our 
evolutionary birth is astounding. Had a skinny dam of land [the Isthmus of Panama] not happened to rise 
from the depths to separate the Atlantic Ocean from the Pacific, then the chain of events that triggered the 
evolution of Homo would never have begun." While many experts would now perhaps agree that there is 
no progress towards higher degrees of intelligence (among the exceptions should be mentioned Stewart 
and Cohen, 1997, esp. p. 114; Wright, 2000), the question of complexity is less straightforward; cp. 
Blackmore, 1999: 13 (and cp. p. 28): "Is there progress in evolution? Gould ... famously argues there is 
not, but I think he has a concept of progress that I do not share. He is right to rule out progress towards 
anything. This is the whole point of Darwin's inspiration — and what makes his theory so beautiful — 
there is no master plan, no end point, and no designer. But of course there is progress in the sense that we 
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beings had appeared only a number of coincidences allowed them to make the next 
steps toward our present state by developing agriculture and domesticating animals, and 
that only in some parts of the world.60 The evolutionary biologist Jared Diamond, in his 
fascinating and thought-provoking recent book Guns, Germs and Steel, enumerates a 
number of geographical factors which might have stopped human progress. I mention 
only two very important ones: some continents had no domesticable animals, or no 
plants that would have made agriculture possible. Is it conceivable that our reflections 
have brought to light one other factor — the presence of a tradition of rational inquiry 
— which for all we know might never have come into being, but without which human 
progress up to our present state might never have taken place?61 
[28] 
 By asking this question, I try to give back to the academic study of Indian 
philosophy a dimension which belongs to it, but which does not attract sufficient atten-
tion. This is not simply a field meant to amuse some few specialists, without much rele-
vance for outsiders. Nor can its only justification be that it may, from time to time, dig 
up an idea that could be of interest to modern philosophers. The study of Indian 
philosophy has to take its place among the other disciplines and sciences concerned 
with the study of human history, i.e. of our heritage,62 from animal origins to an 
                                                                                                                                         
now live in a complex world full of creatures of all kinds and a few billion years ago there was only a 
primeval soup. Although there is no generally accepted measure for this complexity, there is no doubt 
that the variety of organisms, the number of genes in individual organisms, and their structural and 
behavioral complexity have all increased ... Evolution uses its own products to climb upon." 
60 Wilson (1998: 48) enumerates "[t]hree preconditions, three strokes of luck in the evolutionary arena" 
which he believes led to the scientific revolution: 1. the boundless curiosity and creative drive of the best 
minds; 2. the inborn power to abstract the essential qualities of the universe; 3. the "unreasonable 
effectiveness" of mathematics in the natural sciences. This enumeration leaves little space for the, perhaps 
numerous, factors that might have prevented the scientific revolution from happening. Among these the 
occurrence of the Black Death in the fourteenth century is particularly intriguing; cp. Herlihy, 1997: 38: 
"[The plague] broke the Malthusian deadlock that medieval growth had created and which might have 
impeded further growth in different forms. It guaranteed that in generations after 1348 Europe would not 
simply continue the pattern of society and culture of the thirteenth century. It assured that the Middle 
Ages would be the middle, not the final, phase in Western development." and p. 81: "Europe at about 
1300 was a land caught in a Malthusian deadlock, in a demographic and economic situation which 
paralyzed its capacity to improve the ways it produced goods. That system, marked by saturated use of 
resources and stagnant outputs, might have persisted indefinitely. The plague broke the deadlock, and 
allowed Europeans to rebuild their demographic and economic systems in ways more admissive of 
further development." 
61 The "unnatural nature" of modern science is emphasized in several recent publications; see e.g. 
Cromer, 1993; Wolpert, 1992. It is nonetheless often taken for granted that science is the necessary and 
predictable product of societies that have reached a certain level of complexity. The following 
Indological book titles and subtitles are interesting and suggestive in this regard: Vorwissenschaftliche 
Wissenschaft, which is the subtitle of Die Weltanschauung der Bråhmaˆa-Texte by Hermann Oldenberg 
(1919), Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte von Wissenschaft, subtitle of Beweisverfahren in der 
vedischen Sakralgeometrie by Axel Michaels (1978), The Fidelity of Oral Tradition and the Origins of 
Science by Frits Staal (1986). 
62 Jean François Billeter (1998: 77) argues, similarly, in favour of a change in perspective which will 
make Chinese history part of our heritage, i.e. of all mankind. 
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uncertain future.63 In this history what and how people thought is crucially important, 
for it has had a colossal impact. Once given its proper place, the study of Indian 
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